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ABSTRACT
The concept of localism and spatial delineation of the ‘city region’
have seen a renaissance as the de facto spatial political units of
governance for economic development. One articulation of this
has seen the creation of Cardiﬀ Capital Region (CCR) to potentially
enhance Wales’s poor economic performance and secure
democratic forms of social cohesion. City regions have been
vaunted as the ‘spatial imaginary’ for engendering economic
development, but there are considerable state spatial
restructuring tensions. The paper discusses these by following the
development of city-regionalism in Wales and speciﬁcally the
unfolding of the ‘elite-led’ CCR City-Deal.
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Introduction
As was stated by then Secretary of State for Wales, Ron Davies (1999), ‘devolution is a
process, not an event’ – a sentiment deployed that expresses the dynamics and opportu-
nities of devo-statecraft. In following this process within the context of Welsh devolution,
the paper seeks to highlight an interesting series of dynamics with regard to the develop-
ment of city regions as the latest phase in a broader process of sub-national government
restructuring under devolution. City regions have been vaunted as the appropriate scale
for economic growth (Storper, 2013) and this has informed the intentions of both the
Welsh Government and the local authorities of Cardiﬀ Capital Region (CCR) towards
creating city regions.
The paper seeks to engage empirically and analytically with the broader body of litera-
ture on central–local relations in regional and local economic development. Particularly in
the context of previous interventions by Duncan and Goodwin (1988), we show how the
empirical case study of the CCR is actively recasting central–local social relations, and in
doing so, this raises interesting questions on the evolving multilevel and multispatial
dimensions of governance (Jessop, 2016).1 When Duncan and Goodwin formulated
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their ideas on states and uneven development during the 1980s, devolution in the U.K., of
course, did not exist. The paper recasts central–local relations through devolution and
suggests inter-scalar relationships increasingly coming to the fore. It suggests that
notions of being scalar ‘agent and obstacle’ (Duncan & Goodwin, 1988) can provide an
analytical lens in and through which to view the shifting and sticky relationships emerging
between local state(s) and national state(s). The analysis we present from the empirical
material within this paper therefore allows us to cover a current lacuna in the literature
on devolution. This is in terms of how new territorial relations are being created within
the devolved state of Wales through new forms of city region scalecraft. This is recasting
tensions between diﬀerent governance intuitions as the local and national governments
seek to legitimize diﬀerent policy opportunities. Duncan and Goodwin (1988) therefore
oﬀer a useful starting point, which we seek to extend, to consider how diﬀerent ‘agent
and obstacle’ relations are developing in the pursuit of economic growth.
The process of implementing the CCR has not been as straightforward as the successful
signing of the city-deal on 15 March 2016 might suggest (WalesOnline.co.uk, 2016). This
is because it raises several interesting empirical and theoretical concerns with regard to the
implementation of sub-national economic policy in the wake of devolution and austerity
(Waite, 2015). This reﬂects questions concerning: the historic diﬃculty in terms of local
government structure in Wales (Pemberton, 2016) (and more broadly the U.K.); the
process of deal-making itself (O’Brien & Pike, 2015a) – as an elite, technocratic process
that was highly contested amongst elite actors (Ayres, Sandford, & Coombes, 2017); the
framing of the city region as a growth machine to enable speciﬁc actors within a city
region (see Harding, 2007) and ﬁnally how such processes skew the representational
regime of city region away from what could broadly be termed civil society (Jessop,
2016). This ﬁnal section is essential to the paper, as it helps demark a series of legislative
contradictions for the Welsh state. Since devolution the Welsh state has in various ways
attempted to position civil society within processes of governance (see Chaney, 2016);
however, the implementation of the city region agenda suggests a more elitist approach
is being taken in the pursuit of building a city region. This raises a series of question
with regard to social relations (Macleod & Jones, 2007) within the development of the
Welsh State and the representational regimes (Macleod & Goodwin, 1999) of city
regions (Beel, Jones, Jones, & Escadale, 2017).
In working through the above arguments, the paper ﬁrstly gives context as to why the
city region concept has developed in the U.K. and in Welsh policy as the ‘go-to’ scale for
engendering economic growth and what in turn underpins its economic rationale. This
section will also consider how city-deals are made. Secondly, the paper considers what
underpins the CCR City-Deal and how it was constructed and what it intends to do by
looking at how such a policy is transformed when it is transferred over space (Peck &
Theodore, 2015). Thirdly, it will look at the process itself to delineate how local–central
relations in Wales are being actively recast. Fourthly, in highlighting these central–local
processes of what can also be termed ‘scalecraft’ (Pemberton, 2016), the paper discusses
how civil society and non-economic concerns are being positioned diﬀerently through
the political geometry of devolution.
The paper, therefore, attempts to add to debates on devolution and city region building
in the U.K. by looking at such processes through the prism of Welsh devolution and local
government restructuring. This gives the paper a relatively unique set of geographic and
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political conditions upon which to consider how policy is morphed and contested when it
is transferred to diﬀerent places through processes of scalecraft (Peck & Theodore, 2015).
To date, there is only a relatively small amount of literature covering such issues in Wales
and this paper seeks to address this gap by highlighting how the governance framework of
Wales oﬀers a deviating example to consider the multiscalar relations of the U.K. State.
City regions in context
Within the context of U.K. devolution, since 2010, this has been primarily focused towards
delivering devolution to city regions (Clarke & Cochrane, 2013). This represented a
change in spatial emphasis for the U.K. government; one that moved away from previous
the regional set up of Regional Development Agencies, to one concerned with structures
and strategies of local growth. This followed from a number concerns the U.K. govern-
ment had in terms of a desire to reduce the size, scale and cost of regional governance
(Pugalis & Townsend, 2012), a post-crisis reaction to a failing U.K. economy (Mackinnon,
2016) and desire in rhetorical policy terms (at least) to deal with an unbalanced U.K.
economy (Martin, 2015). Alongside this, was also a shift towards the concept of ‘localism’,
whereby a belief was held that by empowering ‘communities’ and the structures of govern-
ance at a more local scale (Wills, 2016), better solutions could be found for dealing with a
lagging economic performance of areas outside of the South East of England (Deas, 2014).
This meant the city region was vaunted as the ‘natural’ and ‘functional’ scale for creat-
ing new governance frameworks to help foster economic development (HM Government,
2015). This belief not only ﬁtted with the above but also followed a growing policy con-
sensus with regard to a dominant discourse in urban policy towards the city region
which is reﬂected in the work of Storper (2013) alongside others (see Glaeser, 2012;
Katz & Bradley, 2014). This built upon the ‘New Economic Geography’ and ‘New Region-
alism’ contextual propositions (Harrison, 2006; Keating, Loughlin, & Deschouwer, 2003)
whereby a central tenant to delivering the city region is that it is considered the appropri-
ate scale to address globalizations challenge to the macroeconomic status of the nation-
state (Calzada, 2015; Scott & Storper, 2003). This points to a longer history of debate as
to whether a city or regional scale is best for engendering economic growth. Within the
U.K., Lord (2009) highlights how such ‘state spatial restructuring’ (Brenner, 2004)
towards a more urban focus began under New Labour (despite their initial regional
focus), which was then subsequently championed by Coalition and Conservative govern-
ments. Here, a historic ‘swinging policy pendulum’ between city and region can be seen to
moving and is highlighted by Harrison (2012), as an evolutionary shift in the appropriate
scale for economic governance towards the city region. In sketching out this earlier period
of city region thinking, both Lord and Harrison highlight the contested and confused
nature of rescaling governance towards city regions as Lord (2009, p. 77) notes, it is posi-
tioned within a ‘congested institutional environment characterised by a confused, and
confusing, nested spatial hierarchy of interventions’.Within the context of Welsh devolu-
tion and the development of CCR a similar sense of institutional and legislative awkward-
ness can be viewed.
Nevertheless, city regions here as spaces of agility; able to adjust much more quickly to
shifts in the global economy, in order to take advantage of economic niches as they arise
(Deas, 2014). In this context, economic growth in a speciﬁc and concentrated location is
SPACE AND POLITY 3
viewed as key in order to provide the best conditions for the ‘agglomeration’ of the city
regions (Nathan & Overman, 2013). This has been reﬂected in U.K. government policy
for the past decade. According to one key source:
The policy implications of theories of agglomeration is that enabling people and ﬁrms to
beneﬁt from proximity to centres of activity, bring beneﬁcial economic outcomes… This
implies empowering and incentivising local government, ﬁrms and people across economic
centres and natural economic geographies [Cities] to promote growth and correct the market
and government failures which are acting as barriers to economic development. (BIS, 2010,
p. 25)
The U.K. government has accordingly embarked on creating city regions within England
through a deal-making process, which has sought to combine metropolitan local auth-
orities together via Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). LEPs and combined authorities
are being presented as the ‘natural’ and ‘functional’ scale of economic activity around
which each city region can strategically plan for future economic growth.
The process is asymmetric in its application due to waves of bespoke public-policy
deals, which have devolved a variety of diﬀerent competencies to combined authorities.
This has meant central government policy has played out very diﬀerently in diﬀerent
places, as some city regions (such as Greater Manchester) have seen greater devolution
granted to them, whereas other areas (such as the Leeds City Region) have failed to get
a deal at all. As such, a select number of city regions have (potentially) beneﬁtted from
being favoured by ministers to implement such deals and others have missed out
(O’Brien & Pike, 2015b). However, such processes have posed many problems for both
city regions with devolution deals and those without, who are potentially striving to nego-
tiate them for competitive advantage (Harrison, 2007). Surrounding these questions are
several factors, which have undermined the devolution process and weakened its potential
to develop more inclusive forms of growth in city regions (Beel, Jones, & Jones, 2016;
Etherington & Jones, 2009).
Firstly, austerity has undermined many of the deals put in place (Davies & Blanco,
2017; Peck, 2012; Shaw & Tewdwr-Jones, 2017) before they have even been enacted.
Austerity has consistently impacted heaviest upon local authorities where higher pro-
portions of welfare claimants can be found. This often coincides with areas which have
been granted deals such as Greater Manchester City Region and Sheﬃeld City Region
(Etherington & Jones, 2016b). In Greater Manchester this equates to around £6 billion
and in Sheﬃeld City Region £1.1 billion to the constituent LAs (Etherington & Jones,
2016a). This has meant real terms cuts to a variety of services and harsher welfare environ-
ment for claimants as local authorities have had to cut their budgets accordingly
(Muldoon-Smith & Greenhalgh, 2015). Therefore, immediately, what has been potentially
gained in terms of extra funding from a devolution or city-deal is lost (see Beatty &
Fothergill, 2016). As austerity impacts those most who have least as services are cut, it
undermines any of the potential for devolution and city-deals to move those people
who are least skilled into the new city regional economies they are trying to create
(Penny, 2016).
The lack of a consideration to the social formation (Jonas, 2012) within city regions
from austerity and the deals themselves, secondly, means a cycle of underachievement
for city regions will be perpetuated, as local authorities are both tasked with
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implementation of cuts to public services alongside developing the city region itself (Ward
et al., 2015). This is then re-enforced by a growth model focused on agglomeration, which
is being aimed for which secondly, highlights the second missing connection. The agglom-
erative trickle-down model (Haughton, Deas, & Hincks, 2014), alongside historic uneven
development (Omstedt, 2016) and a stagnant economy at a national and local levels
(Bailey & Budd, 2016), means that any potential growth will be undermined by a continu-
ing process of uneven development, which will continue to play out within the city region
(Etherington & Jones, 2009b).
Thirdly, there has been a failure to address cultural and historical diﬀerences that
exist across city regions (Breathnach, 2014). This relates most strongly to questions
of accountability but also reﬂects concerns with regard to processes of depoliticization
(see Burnham, 2014; Etherington & Jones, 2018; Foster, Kerr, & Byrne, 2014; Jessop,
2014). Due to the state-centric nature of city and devolution deals, they have not
involved a ‘broader sense’ of public, civil society or grassroots movements in the con-
struction of new forms of governance (see Newman & Clarke, 2009). This has meant
that city region governance structures, such as the combined authority and LEP, have
been somewhat distanced from public scrutiny and the spatial scales upon which they
operate seem to often have little resonance with the publics they seek to serve. This
means that the process of city region building raises serious questions with regard to
the governance structures they create, due to the creation of a democratic deﬁcit
(Buser, 2013; Swyngedouw, 2009; Tomaney, 2016). Within England, city region
mayors are supposed to partially address this but with the creation of a variety of soft
or fuzzy spaces of governance (see Haughton & Allmendinger, 2015; Hincks, Deas, &
Haughton, 2017) such as LEPs and Transition Boards, this can be questioned. Within
these spaces, only certain actors have agency, this suggests that from the beginning
the representational regime of the city region is skewed away from the social relations
of the city regions towards those of economic interest. This would therefore follow that
the process of city region building is in itself is purposefully an act of ‘depoliticisation’
(Burnham, 2014; Etherington & Jones, 2018; Jessop, 2014). Whereby, the ‘elite/expert’
growth model presented is viewed as the only option. This has signiﬁcant impact
upon those who sit outside of this growth model, as it leaves little space to contest
this model within formal governance structures (Rancière, 2004). We take these
concerns forward in the next section, which examines city region building in contem-
porary Wales.
Creating the Cardiﬀ Capital Region
The above context with regard to the U.K. government policy development is important,
for in the process of creating the CCR a similar set of policy stimuluses were cited by the
Welsh Government and the city-deal for CCR was negotiated directly with the U.K. gov-
ernment.2 The following section will now highlight how this played out diﬀerently within
the devolved structures of Wales and the speciﬁc political geographies in play. This is to
highlight what Peck and Theodore (2015) term policy transfer, whereby:
Policies are not, after all, merely being transferred over space; their form and their eﬀects are
transformed by these journeys, which also serve continuously to remake relational connec-
tions across an intensely variegated and dynamic socioinstitutional landscape. (p. 29)
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In following this transformation of the city region construct to ﬁt the political geography
of the CCR, we can trace how the city region concept has been spatially deployed and geo-
graphically reshaped by its transference journey.
Fixing central–local relations in Wales
Wales has its own speciﬁc policy trajectory since devolution, which is both divergent and
aligned to that of the U.K. and the development of city regions highlights this. Therefore,
to create a bridge to the previous contextual section on city region developments in the
U.K./England there is a need to consider how Wales has developed diﬀerently over a
similar period. The consolidation of Wales as a regional/national space of social and econ-
omic governance, with increasingly sharp territorial deﬁnition since the introduction of
devolved government in 1999, has refocused attention on the dynamics of spatial diﬀer-
ence within Wales. Persistent uneven geographies of socio-economic performance, as
well as seemingly entrenched geographies of political and cultural diﬀerence, suggest
the existence of ‘locality eﬀects’ within Wales and present challenges for the delivery of
policy. However, the shape of Wales’s constituent localities is far from clear. Although
Wales has a sub-regional tier of 22 local authorities, these have only been in existence
since 1995, when they replaced a two-tier local government system established in 1974.
Moreover, the administrative map is overlaid and cross-cut by a plethora of other govern-
mental bodies including health boards, police authorities, transport consortia and econ-
omic development partnerships – to name a few – that work to their own territorial
remits. An attempt to produce a more nuanced and process-led representation of
Wales’s internal geography was made with the Wales Spatial Plan in 2004 (updated in
2008; Welsh Government, 2008).
Heley’s (2013) insights reveal this ‘new spatial planning’ for Wales that attempts to
create a more regional and relational approach to governance. Deﬁned as uniquely
Welsh by(Haughton, Allmendinger, Counsell, and Vigar, (2010) but reﬂecting a regional
approach as had been adopted in England, it attempted to ‘regionalise’ the 22 Welsh LAs
into reciprocal relationships of working together. As Heley adds:
TheWSP has six ‘area visions’ …North-West (Eryi a Môn), North-East (Borders and Coast),
Central Wales, Pembrokeshire (The Haven), Swansea Bay (Waterfront andWestern Valleys),
and South-East (The Capital Network). These ‘areas’ are not deﬁned by administrative
boundaries and this, it is suggested, enables partners to work together on common issues
in a ﬂexible way, to improve eﬃciencies, and to overcome problems associated with a
limited local leadership base. These partners include the Welsh Assembly Government, its
agencies, local authorities and private and voluntary/third sector organizations, and each
area has a committee chaired by an Assembly minister and involving senior representatives
of organizations working as part of the area network. (Heley, 2013, pp. 1331–1332)
The approach, therefore, built upon pre-existing regional relationships and sought to
foster these via what was termed a ‘fuzzy’ approach. Heley (2013) suggests the approach
genuinely did shift the spatial imaginaries of policy-makers towards a more relational
approach, however, the inability to generate suﬃcient economic growth and the sub-
sequent downturn in the global economy meant a new approach became desired
(Jones, Orford, & McFarlane, 2015). Added to this, eﬀorts to align the initially ‘fuzzy’
boundaries of the WSP regions with the hard boundaries of local authority areas
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demonstrates the accretional power of ﬁxed institutional geographies in shaping the rep-
resentation of localities (Haughton et al., 2010). With the removal of theWSP focus shifted
away from fuzzy, relational approaches to more territorial deﬁned and metro-centric
approaches. Key here was the City-Region Taskforce in Wales, which was headed by Eli-
zabeth Haywood in 2012, this document sought to develop two city regions in Wales fol-
lowing an agglomerative growth logic. According to Government discourse at the time:
The main factors in our decision to recommend recognition of two city regions in south
Wales were: critical mass; traﬃc ﬂows; community identiﬁcation; existing structures of gov-
ernance, and the fact that our cities contribute less to the economy than cities anywhere else
in the UK, and we need to ensure that contribution grows (Welsh Government, 2012)
The above quote highlights the shift in spatial emphasis of theWelsh Government towards
city regions and its alignment to approaches in England as led by the U.K. government.
This also then positioned both the Welsh Government and the LAs that sit within city
regions surrounding Cardiﬀ and Swansea with the task of implementing and building
their respective city regions.
Alongside this as Pemberton (2016) highlights, the long history of local authority
restructuring in Wales, which has shifted between more ‘regional’municipal areas histori-
cally to the more ‘local’ framework presently in use. The appropriate territorial-ﬁx has also
been diﬃcult in Wales due to both major cities being in the south with a largely rural
population to north, which is fragmented by a diﬃcult physical geography. It is this con-
stitutional geography of the Welsh State and its local government structure, which has
therefore interpreted the city region to produce CCR. This process is important as it high-
lights several important contextual issues: the actors involved; the process of negotiating
multilevel governance; and the shifting relationship between local and national states,
as both agents and obstacles to diﬀerent policy regimes.
Alongside the development of the CCR was a concerted eﬀort by the Welsh Govern-
ment, via then Minister Leyton Andrews, to redraw the local authority map of Wales.
The purpose was to make a strategic move from 22 local authorities to 8 (see Jones et
al., 2015 and Welsh Government, 2015b). This failed due to resistance from Welsh
local authorities and territorially aligned Assembly Members, who did not wish to be
forced so quickly into a process of consolidation:
Similarly, before the recent—or last year’s election in the Assembly when you had a very for-
ceful approach from Welsh Government and they were looking to drive through a reorgan-
isation, there was an awful lot of bad feeling, not only between political parties but within
political parties because of that issue I just mentioned was heightened and I think a lot of
authorities felt their numbers had been cut to pay for an increase in the Assembly and it
was a shift in the balance of power. (Interview 13, LA Rep Body, 2017)
This has led to a slowing of the pace of local authority ‘regionalisation’ but the ‘Reforming
Local Government: Resilient and RenewedWhite Paper’ (Welsh Government, 2017) hints,
this will not disappear as a possibility, especially within the context of continuing austerity.
The unfolding of the above greatly shaped the relationships between 10 local authorities in
the CCR (see Figure 1) and the Welsh Government, which led to two parallel processes of
city region building being put in place. Figure 2 represents this; in the left-hand box there
is CCR Transition Board, which theWelsh Government created. This was to push through
the development of the city region via a selection of local elites, primarily from business
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and education (not too dissimilar to the structure of a LEP board), with the purpose being
to strategically plan the city region’s implementation. To directly negotiate a city-deal with
U.K. government, the local authorities themselves, circumventing the Welsh Government,
however, side-lined this approach:
We’d had positive soundings from the UK Government, we had a bit more of a challenge to
make theWelsh Government see the beneﬁts of a City Deal, but as you know, a City Deal is in
the ownership of local authorities, so we were leading on the concept. We had ten Leaders
who… some may have had a bit of scepticism about it, but were willing for us to explore
it out, so we decided then that we would put together a bit, and we had some support in
helping us to create what a City Deal bid ought to look like. (Interview 14, Local authority
leader CCR, 2017)
This created the governance structure on the right-hand side of Figure 2, which is conti-
nuing to evolve presently through the implementation of the city-deal itself (see Figure 3).
The process of negotiating the city-deal raises two interesting points: ﬁrst, it was
Figure 1. Cardiﬀ Capital Region local authority map. Source: Author.
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negotiated between local authority leaders and the U.K. government, whereby it circum-
vented theWelsh Governments and had little public consultation. This raises both an issue
of accountability due to little consultation being given and second, it suggests that local
government can be both agent and obstacle simultaneously in the implementation of
central government policy – resistant to the city region via the Welsh Government, but
accepting to it from the U.K. government.
Figure 2. The changing structure of the Cardiﬀ Capital Region.
Figure 3. Membership of the Business Council for the Cardiﬀ Capital Region.
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Cardiﬀ Capital Region City-Deal
The CCR City-deal was released March 15th 2016; it is approximately worth £1.2 billion
over 20 years and has a strong emphasis upon the implementation of transport infrastruc-
ture. Also included within the deal are further opportunities in terms of developing digital
infrastructure, improving skills and unemployment, delivering enterprise growth and stra-
tegic planning for future housing and regeneration. It seeks to reﬂect ‘natural’ economic
footprint of the city regional area:
City region boundaries must reﬂect economic reality and not political or administrative
boundaries. Genuine engagement and meaningful collaboration across many local auth-
orities will be needed. This will certainly involve ceding power, funding and decision
making to a more regional level. (Welsh Government, 2012, p. 7)
Although the city-deal reﬂects many of the same policy opportunities included in English
city and devolution deals, as Figure 2 highlights, the proposed structure stops short at
devolving revenue-generating powers to the region, hence no mayor is required. There
will be the ‘CCR Cabinet’ consisting of the then leader from each local authority and in
time, there will also be ‘CCR Economic Growth Partnership’ or as it has been termed
the ‘CCR Business Council’, which will look similar to a LEP and the ‘CCR Business
Organisation’, which will channel business investment for the city region (HM Govern-
ment, 2016). Figure 3 highlights the continuation of the privileging of ‘business elites’
in the process of city region building, as the appointments to the CCR Business
Council only engages active business leaders.3 This again represents a further diﬀerence
from the previous Transition Board, which included Trade Union representation.
The CCR City-Deal, like other settlements, focuses its primary concern on strategies for
generating economic growth within the city region and for the most part this aims to
bolster the opportunities for agglomerative growth within the metropolitan centre of
Cardiﬀ. Despite traversing into other areas, which are related to more social concerns
such as skills and unemployment, the focus and success will largely be measured
against GVA growth. This represents the overall framing of what a city region is meant
to do, that is to generate economic growth, and this is made explicit within city-deal docu-
ment itself:
This City Deal will provide local partners with the powers and the resources to unlock sig-
niﬁcant economic growth across the Cardiﬀ Capital Region. It is a deal that builds on the
region’s sectoral strengths, its high skill base and three successful universities. The City
Deal also provides an opportunity to continue tackling the area’s barriers to economic
growth by: improving transport connectivity; increasing skill levels still further; supporting
people into work; and giving businesses the support they need to innovate and grow. (HM
Government, 2016, p. 2)
The process of enabling ‘local partners’ is then central to the process of creating economic
growth but the focus on economic growth alone hints at those it speciﬁcally aiming to
enable. Added to this, the surrounding media releases on the gov.uk website (see Figure 4),
by various actors involved in creating the deal suggest little else.
Ideologies of growth run deep through the press release statement and several dis-
course-analytic (Fairclough, 2010) points stand out with regard to the model of growth
desired (Clarke, Martin, & Tyler, 2016) and the prescribed ‘representational regime’
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Figure 4. Media press release following signing of the CCR City-Deal, names and title reﬂect those in
post at time (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cardiﬀ-capital-region-city-deal-signed).
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(Rutherford, 2006) in and through which the city region is envisioned. Figure 4 represents
the order in which the statements were published online cascading from 1st to 5th. This is
interesting because it highlights how geographical spatial scale and the production of an
information-content hierarchy are deeply intertwined in each other; U.K. government
ﬁrst, then Welsh Government, and ﬁnally local government and civil society actors last.
Secondly, each of the statements opens the broader policy framework. Interestingly, the
ﬁrst four respondents all focus on very similar things with regard to, devolution to empow-
ering local leaders; increased private sector investment; the city region as a growth engine
to drive investment; more power to local decision makers for transport and infrastructure
to aid further aid investment; and the importance of local leaders and authorities working
together. Rather poignantly, it is only at the local territorial scale whereby we see a break in
this discourse, as the City of Cardiﬀ Council Leader suggests something slightly more pro-
gressive in terms of how this will beneﬁt the lives of people living in the CCR. Hence the
‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Jessop, 2016) for these ideologies of growth is rather telling with
regard to what is being envisioned in and through the city-deal and then which actors
it seeks to spatially select.
Placing civil society
The above discussion points towards the deﬁning of what Jenson and Phillips (1996) have
termed a ‘new citizenship regime’, where governance structures are designed in such a way
that they legitimize some preferred groups over others. Accordingly:
Who qualiﬁes and is recognized as a model citizen is under challenge. The legitimacy of
group action and the desire for social justice are losing ground to the notion that citizens
and interests can compete equally in the political marketplace of ideas (Jenson & Phillips,
1996, p. 112)
In designing the city region to focus primarily on economic growth as its primary target,
this suggests that concerns with regard to more social issues at city region scale are not as
important. Therefore, although each city region will implement its city-deal diﬀerently, the
‘rules of the game’ appear to be shaped in one direction. This, in turn, enables speciﬁc
actors, such as those detailed in Figure 2 to be active in the process of building the city
region. As Jessop (1990, 2016) reminds us, the state has ‘no power of its own’; state
power is deﬁned and aligned according to who has access to, and makes, the state appar-
atus, and the spatial contexts within which this occurs. In this case, business and political
elites are eﬀectively licensed social and civic capital (see Mohan & Mohan, 2002; Painter,
2005) to deliver the city region neoliberal growth model. As is highlighted by the views of a
Transition Board member:
And equally, you don’t get the beneﬁt of suﬃcient quality of advice, because you need
someone at a suﬃcient level where you can attract the right quality of person with the
level of expertise across a wider area. So, my view is very much we need that more strategic
focus, but we need to achieve economies of scale of delivery, and my view is that we should be
having a more technocratic approach to delivery, with targets, and we should have a Regional
Development Corporation. (Interview 18, Business leader, CCR 2017)
This makes it diﬃcult for those who would argue for more socially just or inclusive forms
of growth to be implemented as they are distanced from being active in the new citizenship
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regime. This reﬂects upon the process of city region building as one which purposefully
seeks to depoliticize and remove contestation from its implementation (Etherington &
Jones, 2018). This is done by closing the representational regime (Jessop, 2016) of the
city region to potentially dissenting voices. In highlighting the contested nature as to
how the CCR has been implemented and how economic growth is envisioned, the follow-
ing sections will now discuss the ways in which this has been problematic for civil society
members and why despite statutory requirements for their inclusion, they have been left
out of the city region building process.
Struggling with the economic growth model
The key emphasis, as noted above, is to deliver and enable a governance scale, which is
best, suited for economic growth above all other concerns. This means that other concerns
such as social, cultural or environmental factors are considered less important in compari-
son to creating economic growth. For example, the insight below highlights how the
agglomerative model of ‘boostering’ Cardiﬀ may cause further combined and uneven
development elsewhere, if not appropriately managed:
We are pushing for the Region as a whole in terms about how the impact will have on those
communities furthest away from the nucleus, so you automatically think north in Cardiﬀ’s
case, so the northern Valleys. It’s probably not diﬃcult to correlate the further north you
go, then the worse the indices are in terms of deprivation, further away from the economic
heartland… I constantly talked about northern hubs, so actually, because you can’t concen-
trate the economic investment purely into the centre of Cardiﬀ, because we will have to invest
billions into infrastructure to create the ﬂow of people that we need to have and then we will
stimulate more ghost communities, where people live further away from their caring needs in
terms of where they have ageing parents, they have children that they’re not close to where
they work and they’re not spending their money within those communities, so you don’t get
secondary spend within those communities. (Interview 10, Welsh Civil Society Organisation,
2016)
But as has been previously highlighted, city-deals are not concerned with delivering a
spatially even form of growth. They are looking to increase agglomerative growth in
urban centres. Consequently, contesting the agglomerative growth logic that sees any
growth as good (see Nathan &Overman, 2013) is diﬃcult because this requires a deeply criti-
cal approach to the market itself. This does not ﬁt with the dominant growth logic presented
in the city-deal approach. The extended quotes below, articulate this well as they suggest that
environmental or social responsibilities sit in the background to economic growth and that
raising such concerns makes you less relevant to the process of city region building:
My view is very much that it’s about creating economic drivers within the region to regen-
erate and to challenge some of the key matters around things like employment, which in turn
should impact on poverty etc. And I think one of the reasons that we’re not at the table is we
don’t talk about the city region…Certainly I’ve never picked up there being a sense of the
city region having a similar if not identical… responsibility towards things outside of the
economic agenda, things like – environmental responsibilities or even more fundamental
social responsibilities. In terms of that deﬁnition of it, we’re probably seen as not having
much of a voice. More likely to speak to businesses and get their views on what is good
and what is right about city region as opposed to the third sector. (Interview 9, CCR/
Welsh Civil Society Organisation, 2016)
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This suggests that the neoliberal market-driven approach contained within the CCR
City-Deal lacks the mechanisms to contest the historic failings of the region with regard
to uneven development. The above and below quotes note this, as they suggest that, the
growth model is repeating the mistakes of the past due to the reliance on a ‘trickle-
down’ approach:
Well at the moment, we seem to be looking at measures for economic development, transport
and a market-based model. What I would—I think it’s that terrible phrase, in terms of the
wealth that we generate ‘trickling down’ into other communities which again historically
is not really showing there’s much to be said for that. (Interview 9, CCR/Welsh Civil
Society Organisation, 2016)
Scale and accountability
Interviews with CCR civil society members also raised an on-going tension between the
concept of localism and the city region. The production of the city region changes the
relationships of scale between civil society organizations and how they may engage with
the ‘local’ state:
All of a sudden we become completely insigniﬁcant so whereas at the moment locally we can
lobby quite hard and push the direction on certain things, all of that power would go away
and how to inﬂuence rather than power. So that for us would cause quite a signiﬁcant
problem. If we start working more collaboratively with other similar organisations then
great, we can form a nice little consortium and then we can retain the same level of perceived
power and all will be well with the world. But it doesn’t ﬁt well with how any of us work really;
we work with quite deﬁned communities, we do quite tailored things for them. (Interview 2,
CCR Housing Association, 2015)
The process of what Cox (1997) refers to as ‘scale-jumping’, alluded to in the above quote,
represents a signiﬁcant problem to civil society organizations working in the city region.
As for the most part civil society organizations do not exist on a city region scale and hence
due to their size cannot scale up to address both the needs of the entire city region or can
they contest its rhetoric:
In terms of the city region stuﬀ, I feel we’ve been stung in how we can engage. We’ve been
very interested in engaging but I don’t think organisations like ours are perceived as being a
big enough hitter or having a big enough economic impact to interest them. (Interview 22,
CCR Community, 2016)
This means local voices can be marginalized through what Pemberton (2016) calls ‘scale-
craft’ (the layered processes and practices of making geographical scale) as the governance
structures of city region make them inactive and less relevant to the larger strategic plans
for economic development. Pemberton adds:
A focus on scalecraft highlights that a wider range of actors—including states, social and pol-
itical groups and individuals—are all involved in scalar practices (Fraser, 2010: 334), and may
be attempting to produce, restructure and rescale local government. In so doing, they seek to
create competitive advantage or establish associations or connections to present their inter-
ests. (2016, p. 1309)
This is being employed to through the city region to depoliticize its economic intentions
(see Etherington & Jones, 2018). We have highlighted how contesting the economic model
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was diﬃcult and this section compounds this by the process of shifting the governance
regime on economic development away from democratic accountability at the local
level. This intervention of state restructuring and the creation soft space institutions
(Haughton, Allmendinger, & Oosterlynck, 2013) that hold power chimes with others
observations with regard to how urban governance regimes seek to displace dissent
away from their activities as they build towards a hegemonic consensus to create economic
development (Burnham, 2014; Etherington & Jones, 2016a, 2016b; Foster et al., 2014;
Jessop, 2014). In moving forward, this raises serious questions around how the future
of representation in soft institutional spaces such as growth boards especially if large pro-
portions of civil society actors are placed outside the new citizenship regime. This has left
civil society actors precariously positioned with regard to responding to new ‘devolved’
governance structures and reduced local authority budgets. Wales, however, does
operate diﬀerently to England and there is provision within law through the Wellbeing
of Future Generations Act (Welsh Government, 2015a) that suggests local and civil
society organizations are entitled to forms of representation.
Austerity
Austerity in Wales has landed diﬀerently to the way it has been delivered in England, due
to the Welsh Government passing on the cuts diﬀerently (see Jones et al., 2015). This has
meant that local authorities did not need to cut as deeply and as quickly, initially. Signiﬁ-
cant cuts have come later to local authorities, as the respondents below suggest:
Well obviously, we’ve seen massive, massive cuts in Welsh Government budget and that has
been, in the main, passed on to local government so it’s the local government, I would say, is
probably the largest hit. (Interview 20, CCR/National Level Trade Union, 2016)
So, in my own view, just from what I can see, the impact of austerity, yes, it was back-loaded,
but actually, when it came about, would have had a higher impact on those communities
where we’ve got less private sector employment opportunities, so it would probably be
very similar within inner-city areas as well, if they’ve lost some of their key services and
they haven’t been replaced with jobs from the private sector. (Interview 10, Welsh Civil
Society Organisation, 2016)
This has impacted civil society groups in a number ways but primarily it has left them
squeezed between reduced national and local state funding opportunities whilst at the
same time facing increased demand on the services they oﬀer. For example, the phasing
out of Communities First has impacted several local community groups substantially
(Dicks, 2014). Further to this, austerity has been viewed to be shifting the relationships
between ‘civil society’, ‘state’ and ‘business’.
Well that is a very interesting one; I think the tectonic plates are changing. For us, the future
in terms of being grant-aided by government, that really isn’t going to happen. We know that
the public sector and its days of supporting the third sector in the way it has are coming to an
end. We have to ﬁnd, if we are going to thrive and grown, new relationships and those new
relationships are probably going to have to be with business. (Interview 6, CCR VCS, 2016)
The above is interesting because it suggests a changing set of relationships between state,
business, and civil society whereby as the state reduces its support, civil society may poten-
tially have face a diﬃcult choice. Should it slot more deeply into the neoliberal growth
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model, which makes it diﬃcult for such actors to then contest the economic rationale of
the city region. The respondent reﬂects on this further suggesting a number of diﬀerent
possibilities into the future:
Is there going to be businesses falling by the wayside? Will there be more of a collaboration—
a merger approach? Will new business opportunities be sought and be successfully sought,
where the emphasis very much is on winning new business opportunities rather than
going for grants, looking for investment? – are we going to have to move to a low investment
scenario which people haven’t whole heartedly embraced in the past? As I say, I do get a bit
focused on services, I do see social businesses working in services, complementary to public
services or non-statutory public services of picking up services. I guess there hasn’t been a
massive push for externalisation that there has been in England. (Interview 6, CCR VCS,
2016)
Hence, as the above suggests, the terrain is shifting quickly and this is reshaping the very
structure of civil society organizations and the way in which they will or will not have a
role into the future with regard to the building CCR.
Conclusions
This paper has sought to traverse and situate the complexities of devolution, city region
building, and the (re)positioning of civil society through the development of the CCR.
The paper has looked at the ways in which the U.K. state both deﬁnes and limits devolu-
tion and in this case, the Cardiﬀ Capital Region City-Deal. This is, of course, a geographi-
cal process, with existing geographies inﬂuencing the form and shape of any outcomes
from deal-making public policy (Peck & Theodore, 2010, 2015).
In the context of building the CCR, a simplistic top-down narrative of central govern-
ment implementation and civil society reaction would not have addressed the complexity
of the realpolitik in play. Hence, the historical legacy of economic and governance failures
have created new geographies of governance and these are playing out diﬀerently in Wales
as oppose to the rest of the U.K. Welsh City Region building reﬂects this as devolution,
with austerity and local government reorganization creating diﬀerent structures for
city-deals. Although on-the-surface city regions from the U.K. government are the
‘same policy’, when ﬁltered through scales of governance, the city region is being trans-
formed diﬀerently. This reﬂects a recasting of central–local relations (Jones, 1999; Peck,
1995) at all scales of governance: local authority – city region – Welsh Government –
U.K. government. Added to this the city region agenda has also attempted to construct
nascent relationships of reciprocity between city regions. In the case of CCR, this
means looking to the east and working with Bristol through the creation of the
‘Western Powerhouse’.4 Again this raises a series of further questions for the notion of
‘scalecraft’ for CCR and the Welsh State.
Speciﬁcally, we have sought to empirically demonstrate how both an ‘agent and
obstacle’ (Duncan & Goodwin, 1988) relationship has unfolded in Wales, as diﬀerent gov-
ernance institutions interact. Therefore, despite their political manoeuvrings to secure a
city-deal, the CCR local authorities are still greatly constrained by a lack of ﬁscal
powers and in their subservience to both the Welsh and U.K. governments. This is high-
lighted by their inability to negate austerity and they are hence forced to deliver the necess-
ary cuts as they are passed down to them whilst still implementing the city-deal. Within in
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these processes, the paper has revealed how civil society has been positioned outside the
representational regime, but is also expected to play along in terms of engaging with
the neoliberal growth model as austerity reshapes public service reform. This raises inter-
esting questions with regard to what role or inﬂuence civil society will have to shape a
more progressive city region.
Notes
1. The empirical research for this paper took place between November 2015 and March 2017.
This involved conducting semi-structured interviews with 27 key stakeholders in the CCR.
This ranged from those involved with implementing the CCR itself to civil society
members based within the city region. The data were openly coded, and from this, quotes
were selected to show key points with regard to ﬁndings but also those that highlighted repre-
sentative views.
2. Because devolution is to the Welsh Government, an important diﬀerentiation for Wales,
compared to England, is that no devolution deal has been oﬀered to the Cardiﬀ Capital
Region scale, only a Cardiﬀ City-Deal.
3. See https://www.walesonline.co.uk/business/appointments/cardiﬀ-capital-regionreveals-board-
14299732.
4. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-42737949.
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